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An attempt to contribute to a “phenomenology of prayer" ought to 
begin with the recognition that the word “phenomenology” means 
many different things to many different people. M oreover, it must be 
recognized that none of these usages has any obvious claim to being 
the normative one. Given these inescapable facts, it is therefore in­
cumbent on one who would make such a contribution to define just 
what it is that he or she might mean by “phenomenology.”
At the beginning of the last century, Martin Heidegger presented 
the world with his own views on the nature and tasks of phenomenol­
ogy. Following the lead of Wilhelm Dll they, Heidegger conceived of 
phenomenology as a hermeneutical enterprise. It is in this sense that I 
use the term “phenomenology” in the present essay. Hermeneutical 
phenomenology, at least in Heidegger’s rendition, is premised on two 
basic claims: (1) life, even at the most immediate level, is always al­
ready meaningful; and (2) history is to be understood not primarily 
as a record of “facts” but as rich depository of meaningful expres­
sions of life. Heidegger expresses both of these claims quite clearly. 
The first idea emerges in a lecture course from 1919: “Life as such is 
not irrational (which has nothing whatever to do with 'rationalism '!)” 
(G 56/57 219/187). M aking the same point later on, he writes that 
“Life is not a chaotic confusion of dark torrents, not a mute principle 
of power, not a limitless, all-consuming disorder, rather It Li what It L) 
only ad a concrete meaningful dhape" (G 58 148). Life encounters us as
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having been interpreted in discourse and in practice rather than as 
raw sense-data or an assemblage of meaningless objects. O r, as he 
puts it in Being and Time, objects have practical significance for life, 
they are ‘‘ready-to-hand." The second claim is also made during the 
winter semester 1919—1920: ‘‘The authentic organon o f the understand­
ing o f life id history, not as historical science or as a collection of curios­
ities, but rather as life that has been lived, [history] as it accompanies 
[life] in actual living" (G 58 256).
The primary aim o f this essay is to present a hermeneutics of 
prayer. The more proximal goal, itself motivated by this larger pur­
pose, is to clarify in more detail the nature of hermeneutic phenome­
nology as it applies to the phenomena o f religious life. Accordingly, 
the discussion proceeds in two parts. The first part is largely exposi­
tory and is aimed at clarifying the sense of hermeneutic phenomenol­
ogy through a close reading o f Heidegger's lecture course for the 
winter semester 1920—1921. The second part is a contribution to the 
hermeneutics of prayer in the form of an interpretation o f the New 
Testament that follows the guidelines gleaned from a reading of Hei­
degger's essays and lectures.
1. P rin c ip le s  o f  th e  H e rm e n e u tic s  o f  R e lig io u s  L ife
Heidegger's own approach to hermeneutics is greatly indebted to the 
work of Wilhelm Dilthey. This is something that Heidegger himself 
explicitly acknowledges on many occasions, showering rare praise on 
D ilthey and attempting to defend his w ork against superficial cri­
tiques. The most well-known o f these professions o f allegiance comes 
from Being and Time itself: ‘‘The researches of Dilthey were, for their 
part, pioneering work; but today’s generation has not as yet made 
them its own. In the following analysis the issue is solely one of fur­
thering their adoption" (S Z  377/429). Heidegger devoted a signifi­
cant portion o f his summer semester 1920 lecture course to Dilthey 
(G 59) and gave a lecture at Kassel detailing his assessment of D il­
they's contributions to modern German thought.
I f  we examine both D ilthey and Heidegger closely, it becomes 
clear that religion was by no means a peripheral issue in the develop­
ment o f hermeneutical phenomenology. Hence there is a certain ap­
propriateness in applying a hermeneutical approach to the study of 
prayer. Both Dilthey and Heidegger frequently attest to their convic­
tion that religion is a vital expression of the pretheoretical meaning­
fulness of life. Dilthey, for example, identifies ‘‘moral-religious truth"
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with ‘‘our life as personal experience,” a sphere that is recalcitrant to 
both metaphysical and naturalistic explanations (G S  1 384—5/218). 
Dilthey uses terms such as ‘‘personal experience,” “lived experi­
ence,” and the like as ways of designating the immediate reality of 
human life from which the more rarefied discourse of the sciences 
takes its departure. His conviction is that this immediate level o f ex­
perience cannot be adequately described using the categories of tra­
ditional metaphysics or o f the natural sciences. Instead, religion and 
literature are able to capture its meaning much more accurately- Hei­
degger, too, regards religious life as a decisive exemplification of 
what he calls “factical life-experience” (see G 58 61; G60 82, etc.). 
Both Dilthey and Heidegger also hold that religious life, particularly 
Christian religious life, harbors a unique “feeling for life” that has 
often been covered over or distorted by subsequent work in both the­
ology and philosophy- To put it another way, both Dilthey and H ei­
degger consistently maintain that documents o f the Christian religion 
contain a rare and rich understanding o f the immediacy of life.
Given these views, it is no surprise that both Dilthey and Heideg­
ger devoted their hermeneutical efforts to understanding religious 
life. In what follows, I briefly describe Dilthey s approach to the her­
meneutics o f religious life. The primary focus, however, is on Hei­
degger, whose work represents a continuation and critical adaptation 
of some o f D ilthey’s basic ideas. In D ilthey’s view, religion is to be 
understood under the rubric of “objective spirit.” That is, religion is 
a “purposive system” of beliefs, practices, and traditions that makes 
both self-understanding and mutual understanding possible for indi­
viduals (G S 7  151/173, 153/175, 166/187). “O bjective spirit” is D il­
they’s term for the manifest forms that inner life takes on a grander 
scale. He is careful to distinguish his usage from H egel’s; for Hegel, 
“objective spirit” refers to a stage in the development o f moral cul­
ture (G S 7  148—149/170—171). For Dilthey, on the other hand, “ob­
jective spirit” describes the shared contexts o f meaning that enable 
both self-understanding and mutual understanding between individ­
uals to take place. The forms of “objective spirit” include “education, 
economic life, the law, political activity, religion, sociability, art, phi­
losophy, and science” (G S 7  166/187). “Individuals, as carriers and 
representatives o f the commonalities interwoven in them, can ap­
preciate and grasp the historical genesis o f these commonalities. Indi­
viduals can understand history because they themselves are historical 
beings” (G S 7  151/173).
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Because history is viewed as a repository of "objective spirit” and 
of other “expressions” of pretheoretical life, Dilthey holds that “His­
tory is not something separated From life or remote From the present” 
(G S 7  147/169). In accord with these ideas, D ilthey maintains that 
the only way to understand religious phenomena properly is to trace 
them back to the “inwardness of psychic life” (G S 5  372). In practice, 
this means delving into the developmental process in which the vari­
ous Forms of religious expression, for example, myth, doctrine, 
prayer, come to be formed and articulated (G S5  372).
W hile Heidegger’s own approach to the hermeneutics of religious 
life bears many affinities with D ilthey’s work, there are also impor­
tant differences. The most valuable source for Heidegger’s views on 
the hermeneutics of religion is his winter semester 1920—1921 lecture 
course, appropriately entitled “Introduction to the Phenomenology 
of Religion.” In this course, Heidegger presents his own hermeneuti­
cal approach as a challenge to the usual approaches to the “science” 
of religion (G 60 28). For this reason, Heidegger’s ideas constitute a 
useful point of departure not only for getting clear about what the 
hermeneutics of religion is but also for actually contributing to it in 
an analysis of the central religious phenomenon of prayer.
M uch of Heidegger’s discussion in this lecture course is occupied 
with articulating the flaws of alternative approaches. O ne key fea­
ture of these approaches is the imposition of an alien “classificatory 
order” (Ordnimg) upon the phenomena (G 60 129—130). D ifferent 
kinds of classificatory order have been proposed, and Heidegger con­
siders several of them. O ne involves the attempt to “insert” the mat­
ter under consideration into historical, developmental contexts and 
then to go on to investigate the motives of this development (G 60 
130).1 O ther schemata might be based on what passes for “common 
sense” (G 60 134). Heidegger does not explain what he means by 
these kind of classificatory schemes, but he probably has in mind the 
tendency to read religious concepts like other concepts that have 
arisen in a completely different context. Thus claims such as “God 
saved my soul” are obvioiuly causal claims, and petitionary prayers 
are obvhuuly like any other kind of request.
Another approach might be to classify phenomena in terms of “su- 
pratemporal problems” (G 60 171), a kind of theological Problerrutge- 
schichte? Here, the interpretation of religion would involve tracing 
out various responses to “problems” such as the existence of God, 
the problem of evil, predestination and election, and so on. Finally, 
there might be an “axiologizing” approach, which employs some in­
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dependent hierarchy of values to interpret religious phenomena (G 60 
256).3 W hat all of these approaches share is a tendency to conceal 
the "context of sense” that belongs to religion (G 60 172). O r, as Hei­
degger puts it in another place: "Regional ordering schemata, or 
transcendental ideas, not only do not suffice, but actually block the 
problem atic” (G 60 258).
W hile D ilthey is not named explicitly, there is another aspect of 
the common approach to the "science” of religion that Heidegger is 
quite critical of and which seems to have played an important role in 
D ilthey s actual investigations of religious figures.4 In reflecting on 
how to go about understanding the “situation” of Paul’s epistle to the 
Galatians, Heidegger explicitly refuses the historicist epistemological 
problem of "em pathy” and the crucial category of "personality” (G 60 
88). The task of a genuine "articulation” of the phenomena involved 
in such a subject matter requires that one disregard psychological 
schem ata (G 60 121). F o r example, the “knowing” that Paul dis­
cusses in 1 Thessalonians and the related concept of “spirit” are com­
pletely Falsified if one takes contemporary psychology as a starting 
point (G 60 123). This "know ing” is an integral part o f the life of a 
Christian, a life of "serv ice” and "w aiting.” "K now ing” does not 
"swing Free” of this context (G 60 123).5 That is, this "knowing” is 
not a matter of indifferent, objective cognition of neutral Facts; to the 
contrary, it is a special kind of self-knowledge, a way of identifying 
oneself with a particular history or ministry. In a final remark, which 
surely aims at the kind of interpretation associated with Dilthey, 
Heidegger states unequivocally that “The explication of the proclam a­
tion does not have the purpose of producing a contributing page to 
some picture o f a personality as a particular type” (G 60 138; emphasis in 
original).
H eidegger’s principal w orry about the sorts of approaches out­
lined above is that they fail to do real justice to their subject matter, 
in this case religious life. After all, a cardinal principle of hermeneu­
tics is that one should try to avoid doing unnecessary violence to the 
text under consideration. But how is it that justice can be done? The 
key concept for Heidegger at this stage in his career is "life ,” or ‘Tac­
tical life-experience.” F o r Heidegger, concepts such as “mind,” 
"spirit,” "consciousness,” and the like must give way before a more 
nuanced appreciation between the interpenetrating context of mean­
ing, individual, social, and environmental, that comprises the full 
richness of life (G 60 11—14). The project for the philosophy of reli­
gion then becomes one of appreciating the sense of religious words
H eid egger an d  the P ro sp e ct o f a  P henom enology o f  P ra y e r  ■ 123
and actions within this context rather than reducing their meaning to 
some kind of explanatory ground or inserting them within some alien 
schema.
In both the winter semester 1920—1921 and the summer semester 
o f 1921, Heidegger is concerned with Christianity, with the meaning 
of several very specific instances of Christian language. The claim is 
that we must understand the things that Paul or Augustine say 
within the context of an “anxious worry” (Bekiimmerung) about salva­
tion and life (G 60 69). Heidegger employs a number of different 
terms for this context, but they all essentially point to the same 
idea: the “enactment-historical situation” (G 60 88), a “factical life- 
environment” (G 60 128), a “structural context” (G 60 129), a totality 
o f relations in which linguistic content is embedded (G 60 136), and 
a “context of enactment” (G 60 138). These expressions are all more 
or less interchangeable ways of emphasizing the claim that religious 
language can be adequately understood only when it is viewed in re­
lation to its practical context in actual life. The context in which reli­
gious words and deeds make sense is not that of giving a theory, 
demonstrating propositions, or explaining the way things are. In ­
stead, to use Heidegger's language, the context is the “how” of a cer­
tain kind of life.
How do we approach this context in order to understand religious 
meaning? Heidegger variously terms his basic approach “phenome­
nological” or “enactment-historical” (G 60 173). We begin with a par­
ticular, definite religiosity (G 60 124). Hence we do not take it for 
granted that there is some universal something called “religion” or 
even that there is such a thing called “Christianity-” The context that 
opens up the sense of Paul's words is not that of Augustine nor of 
Luther, nor of anyone else besides Paul. The task, then, is one of 
“explication” of the sense from out of this context (G 60 129). O ur 
job  is not simply descriptive, but one of “extraction” (Heraiynabtne) 
(G 60 129). O ur job  is the hermeneutical task of making the meaning 
explicit through the “fundamental enactment of a preconception.” 
This is not achieved through the imposition of a classificatory order 
but in the hermeneutical back-and-forth between our preconception 
and the subject matter. Instead of uncritically utilizing our assump­
tions, we push ourselves out into the difficulties faced by trying to 
understand the sense (G 60 129). W hat is required is not the pre­
tended objectivity of “common sense” but radical transparency re­
garding one's own assumptions (G 60 131).
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Heidegger’s studies of Paul and Augustine provide a number of 
illustrations of this kind of approach. In looking at Galatians, we must 
have an eye to Paul’s situation, which is one of "struggle” and has 
nothing to do with theoretical contexts (G 60 72).6 The seeming self­
evidence of our usual readings of Paul’s texts needs to be called into 
question (G 60 79). Beginning with the context o f struggle and of 
"proclam ation,” we must try to explicate the meaning of what Paul 
says (G 60 87). In general, the "w hat” of these letters can be grasped 
in an accurate way only if  one pays attention to the "how ” of the 
community (G 60 145). The real content, or meaning, lies embedded 
in a "factical life-experience” that has "come to language” in the ex­
change between Paul and the Thessalonians, not in the "polish and 
detachment of theory” but rather in the "turnings and aberrations of 
factical life in its travail” (G 60 145). W ith respect to Augustine and 
his discussions of tentatw in Book X  of the Confessions, Heidegger ar­
gues that we cannot understand this as an objective "theory” about 
human life but must see it within the overall structure of the presen­
tation of these ideas, that is, as a confess io (G 60 212).
W hat, then, can one say about the principles of a hermeneutics of 
religion? There are five main lessons to be drawn here, which are not 
to be taken as independent directives but as expressions of an overall 
strategy for doing philosophy: (1) one ought to renounce the urge for 
generality, instead contenting oneself with the task of understanding 
a particular instance of religious sense, which itself might be more 
ambitious than it looks; (2) one ought to eschew uncritical construc­
tions, particular those involving theory and common sense, but in­
stead let one’s presuppositions be challenged by the subject matter; 
(3) the subject matter of philosophy of religion is not "doctrine” nor 
is it the psychology of believers but is the sense or meaning of what 
religious people say; (4) this meaning must be contextualized, viewed 
in terms of its "situation” in life—th e  things that religious people say 
are expressions of a particular way o f life; (5) the task, then, is to "ex ­
plicate” this sense in a way that does justice to its context, a task that 
ultimately amounts to finding the meaning of religion in life.
2 . C o n trib u tio n s  T o w a rd  a  H e rm e n e u tic s  o f  P r a y e r
Now that some much-needed clarity regarding the nature of herme­
neutical phenomenology has been achieved, the task is to offer a con­
tribution to our understanding of prayer that follows the principles 
set forth above. I begin my exposition with a brief synopsis of Hei­
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degger’s reading of the basic meaning o f primitive Christian life- 
experience. I find this interpretation to be not only substantially cor­
rect but also illuminating w ith respect to the phenomenology of 
prayer. Hence I aim to fulfill the hermeneutical requirement that one 
make one’s guiding preconceptions about a subject matter as explicit 
as possible.
O n H eidegger’s view, the "life-w orld” of the first Christians is 
structured by the uncanny uncertainty of being existentially sus­
pended between the intrusion of the "proclam ation” of the Cross and 
the incalculable arrival of the Parousia. Heidegger understands the 
core of the “proclam ation” to be the announcement that Je su s  of 
Nazareth, a man apparently cursed by God, has in fact been exalted 
by God to be the agent of universal salvation/ The meaning of Chris­
tian life can be most clearly discerned in the community’s response 
to this proclamation: a “turning toward God and away from idols” 
(G 60 95; emphasis in original). Indeed, the proclamation cannot be 
fully understood apart from its connection to this response, which 
Heidegger also describes as "running the course of one’s life before 
God \Wandeln rnr Goti\ and waiting upon him in service \Erharren\," 
and as the "achievement of a living, effective connection with G od” 
(G 60 95). It is precisely this new way of life, defined as a connection 
with God, which is the indispensable condition for gaining a proper 
understanding of prayer. It is also crucial to recognize that part of 
the meaning of Christian life is eschatobpical expectation. The procla­
mation of the Crucified is also the proclamation of the Coming One 
(G 60 97—98). Hence, rather than allowing his flock to indulge in 
worldly curiosity about the date and time of the Parousia, Paul ad­
monishes them to be "w akeful” and “sober” (G 60 105). Again, the 
accent is not on getting hold of the right theory about the world or 
the proper view of history, but on one’s own personal living link with
God (G 60 112).8
O ne aspect of this wakeful Christian life that Heidegger leaves out 
o f his own discussion is prayer. This is somewhat puzzling, given that 
prayer is obviously a practice that is historically definitive for the life- 
experience of Christian faith. Prayer is an integral component of the 
web of practices and beliefs that constitutes the unique meaning of 
Christian life. Hence my aim in what follows is to correct this lacuna 
in Heidegger’s exposition while attempting to remain true to his prin­
ciples. How, then, must I proceed? First, I take as my material for 
this interpretation a specific religious "expression.” Furthermore, I 
relinquish any claim to make pronouncements about the "essence” of
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prayer as something over and above the meaningful content of this 
particularly expression. Third, if  history is truly the ‘‘organon for un­
derstanding life,” then my focus will be on interpreting what has 
been written about prayer. Following these guidelines, then, I take 
prayer in the early Christian community as my theme, relying on this 
community’s own self-expressions in the New Testament.
Before carrying out this project, however, a few cautionary re­
marks are in order. First, what follows is not intended as a definitive 
theological account o f the biblical concept o f prayer.9 Indeed, I am 
not offering a piece of biblical theology at all. Second, I will not ex­
amine in any detail many of the philological and exegetical issues in­
volved in understanding what the New Testament says about prayer. 
For example, I will not explore the different kinds of prayer that are 
discussed, nor will I examine the absence of the Greek “prtMeuchomai" 
and its cognates from the ‘‘Joh an n in e” writings.
The first thing that must be established is the claim that prayer is 
indeed an expression o f the meaning of Christian life as it was lived 
in the first century o f the Common Era. Fortunately, even the most 
cursory glance at the New Testament shows that it was indeed a cru­
cial part o f what it meant to be a Christian. For example, prayer is a 
central and recurring element in Luke’s portrayal of Jesu s. Luke de­
picts Je su s  either praying or teaching about prayer at least twelve 
times. Indeed, all o f the so-called ‘‘Synoptic” Gospels have Je su s  
praying either before or immediately after important moments in his 
ministry (e.g., M att. 14:23; M ark 1:35; Luke 3:21). It is no surprise, 
then, that Luke also describes the centrality o f prayer to the post- 
Easter community (e.g., Acts 1:14, 6:4, 9:40, 12:12ff., 16:25). Sim i­
larly, Paul and the other epistle w riters are continually exhorting 
their readers to prayer, asking for their prayers, and offering prayers 
of their own. ‘‘I urge that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and 
thanksgivings be made for everyone” (1 Tim. 2:8). ‘‘Devote your­
selves to prayer, keeping alert in it in thanksgiving” (Col. 4 :2). The 
members o f the early community regarded themselves as living a new 
life, albeit one that was yet to be completely fulfilled. M ore often than 
not, their prayers reflect their longing for this fulfillment. They also, 
however, reflect the attitude of mutual love and service that defined 
their ethos.
As I have already pointed out, Heidegger identifies eMhatobgy as 
the central factor in early Christian life.10 Eschatology, on Heideg­
ger’s reading, is not so much a matter of one’s particular theoretical 
commitments regarding the meaning of history but rather is the con­
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text within which one leads a certain form of life. As such, it forms 
the deep background against which we can best make sense of what 
it means to pray. This is revealed, for example, by the scene in the 
Garden of Gethsemane. The eschatological meaning of prayer as it 
appears in this passage emerges most clearly if it is juxtaposed with 
an earlier scene in which Je su s  delivers his eschatological message:
But about that day or hour no one knows, neither the angels in 
heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father. Beware, keep alert; 
for you do not know when the time will come. It is like a man 
going on a journey, when he leaves home and puts his slaves in 
charge, each with his work, and commands the doorkeeper to 
be on the watch. Therefore, keep awake — for you do not know 
when the master of the house will come, in the evening, or at 
midnight, or at cockcrow, or at dawn, or else he may find you 
asleep when he comes suddenly. And what I say to you I say to 
you all: keep awake. (M ark 13:32—37)
Holding this passage in mind, turn now to two passages from the 
story about the night in the Garden:
[1] He came and found them sleeping; and he said to Peter, 
‘‘Simon, are you asleep? Could you not keep awake one hour? 
Keep awake and pray that you may not come into the time of 
trial; the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is w eak” (M ark
14:37ff.).
[2] He came to them a third time and said to them, ‘‘Are you 
still sleeping and taking your rest? Enough! The hour has 
come; the Son of M an is betrayed into the hands of sinners.” 
(M ark 14:41)
This story, of course, precedes the arrest, trial, and death of Jesu s. 
Here the disciples find themselves poised on the frontier of the new 
age, of the decisive revelation of God. This is clear from the saying 
about the ‘‘Son of M an” in M ark 14:41. Taken together with the ear­
lier eschatological discourse, we can see that watchful prayer is an es­
sential response to the message of the imminent kingdom of God. 
Praying in a spirit of ‘‘watchfulness” means praying with one's eyes 
peeled and ears opened for the fulfillment of the new creation. It ex­
presses a life that already has one foot in God's future, so to speak. 
Those who are caught off guard, absorbed in worldly affairs, experi­
ence the arrival of this future as destruction and judgment. For those 
who are prepared, whose lives are lives of wakeful prayer, it is salva­
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tion. For Paul, too, prayer (indeed, constant prayer) is the appropriate 
attitude to take for one who expects the dawn of a new age. See, for 
example, the frequently referenced lines “Rejoice always, pray without 
ceasing, give thanks in all circumstances, for this is the will o f God in 
Christ Jesu s for y o u ” (1 Thess. 5 :16f.). Similarly, Paul admonishes 
the Romans to "R ejo ice in hope, be patient in suffering, persevere in 
prayer” (Rom . 12:12).
W hat does all this tell us about what prayer means? Clearly, it is a 
practice that is integral to the "serving” and "w aiting” that constitute 
the sense of Christian life. The primitive church regarded itself as the 
messianic community, the community of those who had been called 
out of the world to a new life of earnest prayer, mutual love, and 
eschatological anticipation. Unceasing prayer is taken as a definitive 
expression of this new life. It is an activity that, together with liturgi­
cal rites, charitable actions, and the proclam ation of the Gospel, 
makes Christian life what it is. Divorced from this overall context, 
prayer takes on the character of magical formulae. Like enthusiastic 
eschatological expectation, a prayer that is not part o f a Life o f prayer 
involves no personal commitment. At best it is a way to fit in with a 
particular group and at worst it is sheer presumption. The Christian 
denunciation o f practices such as divination, magic, and fortune- 
telling is founded on the idea that these activities are rooted in a 
worldly curiosity about the divine secrets. It is as if one were trying 
to reduce the incalculable future of the kingdom of God to something 
that can be "m anaged.” Having done so, one can go on crying "Peace 
and security! ”
I f  prayer is not to degenerate in this way, then it must be seen as 
part o f a total life, a life that is a response to the proclamation of the 
coming Kingdom of God. Such a life is often called a life "in  the 
Sp irit.” Hence it is not surprising to find admonitions to "pray in the 
Holy Sp irit” (Ju d e  1:20), to "Pray in the Spirit at all times in every 
prayer and supplication” (Eph. 6 :18). This life "in the Spirit” is cen­
tral to the meaning of the eschatological way of life that itself makes 
prayer intelligible to us. But what does "in the Sp irit” mean, espe­
cially when it is said of prayer?
The gift o f the Spirit is regarded as yet another sign that a new 
age has begun and the old one is passing away. Jesu s had promised 
his followers that they would be "baptized with the Holy Sp irit” and 
would "receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon [them ]” 
(Acts 1:5, 8). Praying "in the Sp irit,” then, means recognizing prayer 
itself as a gift, as a part o f the radically altered existential situation of
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those who have received the gift o f the Spirit. Following the return 
from the Babylonian exile, the consensus among large groups of the 
Jew ish  population was that the Spirit o f God was no longer available 
as it had been during the period of classical prophecy. One of the 
hopes for the messianic age was that this Spirit would be "poured 
out on all flesh." The gift o f the Spirit regenerates broken lives, gives 
courage to live for the future of God, and, most important for the 
present discussion, bestows a new intimacy with the divine. But of 
what sort is this gift? Paul puts it this way:
For all who are led by the Spirit of God are children of God. 
For you did not receive a spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, 
but you have received a spirit o f adoption. W hen we cry, 
“Abba! Fath er!", it is that very spirit bearing witness with our 
spirit that we are children of God, and if  children, then heirs, 
heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ. (Rom. 8:14—17)
Prayer is the expression of a new life, a life of “adoption" or “filia­
tion ." Indeed, “expression" is a more appropriate term here than 
“obligation." W hile it is certainly true that the early Christians were 
admonished to “pray without ceasing" and to be “w atchful," it is 
equally clear that prayer expresses an attitude of joy and thanksgiv­
ing on behalf o f people who had been liberated from sin and death. 
Indeed, Paul is careful to add “rejoice" to his exhortations to con­
stant prayer (see Rom. 12:12; Phil. 4 :4 -7 ; Col. 4:2ff.; 1 Thess. 5:16f.). 
The sense of the new age, o f which the early Christians viewed them­
selves as citizens, is that sinners have been granted the ability to 
share in Christ's intimacy with God. This intimacy was expressed in 
Je s u s ’ life not only by his preaching and healing but above all by his 
prayers. Jesu s  often prayed in solitary places at times of the day when 
he was sure to be alone and undisturbed. Even his teaching about 
prayer reflects this spirit o f intimacy. For example, he admonishes 
his listeners not to “heap up empty phrases like the Gentiles do" 
(M att. 6 :7). Ancient people often approached their gods as they did 
their rulers and felt compelled to observe all the proper protocols. 
Jesu s, however, dismisses these practices as useless and harmful for 
“children" addressing their “Father" in a spirit o f liberated intimacy.
Employing Heidegger's hermeneutical principles has thus given 
us a definite picture of the meaning that prayer had in the life of the 
primitive Christian community. Prayer is part of a whole pattern of 
life, a pattern that is best understood as a joyful response to the gift of 
freedom and new intimacy with God. We would, however, be letting
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ourselves off easy were we simply to rest with this sort of "objective” 
description of the meaning of prayer in a particular community. This 
is not to say, of course, that it is easy to stick ‘‘to the things them­
selves,” as phenomenologists like to say. But there is an element of 
Heidegger’s hermeneutics that I have so Far left undiscussed. Unlike 
the ‘‘objective-historical” mode of analysis that he rejects, ‘‘Phenome­
nological understanding . . .  is determined From the enactment of the 
one who is engaging in reflection” (G60 82). Or, as he puts it later, 
‘‘One must only be directly and absolutely interested in the explica­
tion and about it, and tm u l be so authentically” (G60 129; emphasis 
in original).
These remarks indicate that Heidegger belongs among those phi­
losophers, such as Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Rosenzweig, for whom 
philosophy of religion is not like botany or toxicology. That is, it is 
not a matter of establishing the ‘‘Facts” about religion so that one can 
file them away. The philosophical search for religious meaning puts 
the searcher herself into question, opening up the possibility that reli­
gious meaning is more than an interesting historical aside but is a 
real challenge to our own self-understanding. Dilthey formulates this 
hermeneutical principle thus: “History is not something separated 
from life or remote from the present.” In a lecture on Dilthey from 
1924, Heidegger makes this point more dramatically: “We are his­
tory, i.e., our own past. Our future is lived from out of the past. We 
carry the past with us” (S 174).
This means that a hermeneutics of prayer must in the end also be 
a call to prayer. Hermeneutics illumines the life-context and basic atti­
tudes that belong to a community not simply so that our historical 
curiosity might be satisfied but also so that the past might become 
meaningful for our future. The hermeneutical insight is that this can­
not be accomplished by making pronouncements about the ahistor- 
ical “essence” or “nature” of a practice like prayer or by insisting on 
the use of “classificatory orders.” Instead, by reading a concept or a 
practice in order to determine its meaning for life, hermeneutics 
makes it possible for this concept or practice to become meaningful 
again for our life. Prayer, like any religious concept, really makes 
sense only as a practice—its meaning dawns on us in the work of liv­
ing it out.
The hermeneutics of prayer that I have offered here makes a num­
ber of claims on our present and on our future. First, prayer ought 
to be an expression of a Christian’s alienation from the world of sin 
and death, an alienation that is ultimately grounded in the expecta­
H e id e g g e r  a n d  th e  P ro s p e c t o f  a  P h en o m en o lo g y  o f  P ra y e r  ■ 151
tion of the redemption of this same world. Prayer is a practice that 
both expresses a new life and reconnects one with it. Second, prayer, 
even petitionary prayer, ought to be a joyous response to an experi­
enced liberation From slavery of all kinds, the expression of a new 
intimacy with the divine. To “pray without ceasing” is to live From 
out of a Future that places the patterns and practices of the past into 
question. Prayer expresses the new orientation of a life that has been 
set Free. As an expression of such a life, prayer is not a burden or a 
"duty” but a grateful expression of a new creation. In the end, how­
ever, the meaning of prayer is something that must not merely be 
talked about but must be lived anew in each case. Apart from the 
actual practice of prayer in the context of a new life in the Spirit, 
"prayer” is a meaningless word.
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